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Abstract When interpreting a sentence such as Every time the company fires an
employee who comes in late, a union complaint is lodged, an addressee is likely to
infer that the union will only complain when an employee is fired because he came
in late. One is thus led to ask why a purely pragmatic enrichment of this sort — one
drawn despite no risk of interpretative failure nor other linguistic mandate — would
intrude upon truth conditions. We argue that this effect results from the interaction
among three pragmatic phenomena: presupposition, the associative mechanisms that
underlie the establishment of coherence in discourse, and the calculation of domain
restriction for quantificational operators. Because the analysis does not consider the
operative enrichments to be species of implicature, we claim that such cases do not
represent an intrusion of implicature into truth-conditional content. Instead, they
merely involve the context-dependent determination of quantificational domains.
Keywords: pragmatic enrichment, presupposition, domain restriction, discourse coherence
1 The puzzle
Consider (1) and (2):
(1) Every time the company fires an employee who comes in late, a union
complaint is lodged.
(2) If the company fires an employee who comes in late, a union complaint will
be lodged.
After taking a moment to ruminate on what these sentences mean, consider Snod-
grass’s Situation. The company Snodgrass worked for discovered that he was
embezzling money, and decided they needed to fire him when he next came to work.
And sure enough, when he did come in — 15 minutes late, as it so happens — he
was promptly dismissed. Snodgrass’s union of course caught wind of this, but after
considering the details of the situation and the evidence against their member, opted
to do nothing.
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Could (1) and (2) still be judged true on this scenario? One might well think
not. After all, Snodgrass was an employee who came in late and got fired, hence
satisfying the domain restriction and antecedent of (1) and (2) respectively, yet the
union failed to act in the manner specified. Our intuitions nonetheless tell us that
they can in fact still be judged true: whereas Snodgrass was fired and he came in late,
he was not fired because he came in late. As such, there is a pragmatic enrichment at
play; one that leads us to judge that the situation sits outside of the domain restriction
of (1) and the antecedent of the conditional in (2). The enrichment has no linguistic
mandate — it results from drawing an association between the meanings of two
constituents for which there is no direct relationship in the syntax, specifically a
matrix verb and a relative clause that modifies the object noun phrase. So why does
this enrichment intrude upon the truth conditions of (1) and (2)?
According to the analysis that follows, this effect results from the interaction
among pragmatic presupposition, the associative mechanisms that underlie the
establishment of coherence in discourse, and the calculation of domain restriction.
In particular, in producing examples (1) and (2) with the intention to convey the
enrichment, a speaker pragmatically presupposes that a defeasible causal relation
necessary for the hearer to make the inference is part of the common ground, and
further intends it to restrict the set of situations over which the quantifier in (1) and the
antecedent of (2) are evaluated. The analysis connects the associative inferences that
underlie the establishment of coherence relations between sentences in a discourse,
a class of intrasentential enrichments that result from the same principles, and the
manner in which pragmatic inferences that originate from presuppositions restrict
the domains of conditionals and quantified expressions. We consider these topics in
turn.
2 Coherence establishment
According to Stalnaker (1979), the assertion of natural language utterances provides a
way for a speaker to constrain the set of possible worlds that her hearer will entertain
as being the actual one. However, it has long been noted (Hobbs 1990; Kehler
2002; Asher & Lascarides 2003; inter alia) that, when presented with co-occurring
utterances in a discourse, comprehenders are not content to merely update their
world models with the meanings of each utterance. Instead, they seek to establish
some sort of semantic relationship — a COHERENCE RELATION — between them.
Consider (3a), for example.
(3) a. The company fired the employee. He came in late.
b. ? The company fired the employee. He has red hair.
Addressees will typically infer an EXPLANATION coherence relation for (3a),
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whereby the second sentence expresses the cause or reason for the event described
in the first.
EXPLANATION: For eventualities e1 and e2 described by utterances S1 and S2 re-
spectively, infer that cause(e2)(e1).
Crucially, the ability to infer a causal relationship is not unconstrained: it relies on
certain beliefs being in the common ground, in this case, that being late to work
could cause one to be fired. This is what goes wrong for (3b), as world knowledge
typically does not similarly associate having red hair and getting fired. This fact
is likewise contingent on the beliefs of the interlocutors, however: If it is in the
common ground that the CEO despises redheads (after all, her former husband ran
off with one), the passage may well be coherent after all.
Axiom (4) represents a possible encoding of an associative rule that captures the
relationship between being late to work and getting fired.
(4) λ s.∀s′[AccC(s)(s′) &
∀x,e1,e2 ≤p s′ [employee(x) & come_in_late(e1)(x) &
f ire(e2)(employer(x))(x) & te1 < te2
⇒ cause(e1)(e2)≤p s′]]
Axiom (4) is articulated in terms of a situation semantics, although nothing we say
below hangs on this implementational choice. Let us take a moment to unpack the
rule. Suppose that we have an agent who is working at a company and sees an
employee come in late, and soon thereafter, get fired. Rule (4) captures the default
inference that the agent is likely to make, i.e., that the coming in late caused the firing.
Specifically, it says is that in any situation (subject to the accessibility condition Acc;
more on this below) in which an employee comes in late and subsequently1 gets
fired, one can conclude that the two events are causally related. On the other hand,
as mentioned above, our agent’s knowlege store will typically not contain a similar
rule that causally relates having red hair and getting fired. Hence, under normal
circumstances, when one witnesses someone get fired who happens to have red hair,
no causal inference is drawn.
Of course, such rules are defeasible — it is certainly not true in all situations
(Snodgrass’s, for example) in which the events of being late and getting fired occur
that the two are causally related. We capture this property by borrowing tools from
the Kratzerian theory of modals (Kratzer 1981). Consider the situation in which our
agent, having witnessed the sequence of events just described, utters (5).
1 The ordering restriction on event times in (4), while satisfiable in our non-linguistic scenario, may
not always be entailed by the denotation of a linguistic description of the scenario. In such cases, the
ordering will have to be accommodated by the hearer, outside of information to the contrary.
963
Kehler and Cohen
(5) Snodgrass must have gotten fired because he came in late.
Surely our agent is not using must to mean that it is impossible that Snodgrass got
fired for some other reason. Instead she is saying that it must be the case as long as
one makes certain assumptions about the situation, e.g., that events bear stereotypical
associations with one another. Kratzer’s theory captures this effect by interpreting
sentences like (5) against two sets of propositions (termed CONVERSATIONAL
BACKGROUNDS). The first background constitutes the modal base, which here we
take to be epistemic — the set of facts known to the interlocutors about the situation
they are in. The second background constitutes the ordering source, which we take
to be stereotypical — those situations that correspond to the normal course of events.
Interpreted against these backgrounds, (5) therefore says that in all of the situations
consistent with what we know and that are closest to the ideal — which, following
Portner (2009), we refer to as the BEST situations — Snodgrass was fired because
he came in late. For simplicity, we capture the joint effects of these backgrounds in
terms an accessibility relation (Acc) on situations (see also Toosarvandani (2014),
who represents causal laws in a similar manner). Note that if it were to subsequently
come to be known to the discourse participants that Snodgrass was fired because he
was embezzling money, sentence (5) could no longer be considered to be true. Here,
the occurrence of the embezzling and the causal relationship between the embezzling
and the firing would become part of what is known, and hence added to the modal
base. Per what is stereotypical about such situations, the proposition that the lateness
caused the firing would no longer be contained in the best situations per the ordering
source.
Axiom (4) comes into play during the interpretation of our examples in a similar
manner. Specifically, we argue that a speaker who utters (3a), and does so with the
intention that the appropriate coherence relation be established by the addressee,
pragmatically presupposes (Stalnaker 1974, 1998) that the knowledge captured by
(4) is in the common ground. The addressee, who is trying to understand the situation
being described, recognizes that (4) provides the basis for inferring that the situation
includes a causal relation between the events, in the absence of information to the
contrary. Assuming further that it was the speaker’s intention to convey that relation,
the hearer thus draws the causal inference. The inference of causality in turn satisfies
the constraints associated with the Explanation relation, allowing for the coherence
of the passage to be established.
The idea that presupposition is at play in examples like (3a) receives partial
(if not conclusive) support from application of the “Wait a minute” test (Shanon
1976; von Fintel 2004).2 To see how the test works, consider (6a) which, per a
2 Another standard diagnostic for presuppositional status — the so-called family-of-sentences test —
relies on projection behavior in a range of embedding environments (see Chierchia & McConnell-
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common analysis of the verb stop, not only asserts that Snodgrass does not smoke,
but presupposes that he used to. Despite the fact that the denial in (6b) fails to
contradict the assertion of (6a), it is perfectly felicitous. Its felicity results from the
fact that it denies what is presupposed by the utterance of (6a).
(6) a. A: Snodgrass stopped smoking.
b. B: Hey, wait a minute. Snodgrass never smoked to begin with!
Analogously, (7) provides a felicitous a response to (3a) despite failing to contradict
either of its assertions.
(7) Hey, wait a minute. Union rules don’t allow someone to be fired for coming
in late!
Instead, it targets the stereotypical connection between lateness and firing that
our speaker presupposes when uttering (3a) — i.e., that (4) is mutually believed
and applicable to the situation. Importantly, what is presupposed here is only the
defeasible causal law. The fact that it applies to the employee mentioned in (3a) is a
pragmatic enrichment that is made in light of this law, i.e., it is not itself presupposed.
Our claim that the constraints associated with coherence relations are presup-
positional is supported by the behavior of other, non-causal relations. Consider
(8a):
(8) a. Country singers sometimes sell more albums than your typical pop star.
Taylor Swift’s latest album sold 9 million copies.
b. Hey, wait a minute. I thought Swift was a gospel singer!
On its most natural interpretation, example (8a) is understood as instantiating an
EXEMPLIFICATION relation:
EXEMPLIFICATION: Infer p(a1,a2, ...) from the assertion of S1 and p(b1,b2, ...)
from the assertion of S2, where bi is a member or subset of ai for some i.
That is, Exemplifications are characterized by a general statement followed by a
more specific instantiation of it. When a speaker utters (8a), she is presupposing
the information necessary to satisfy the constraints associated with the relation —
in this case, that Taylor Swift is an example of a country singer, and that 9 million
copies is an example of more albums than a typical pop star sells. Importantly,
Ginet (2000) for discussion). Unfortunately this test appears to be inapplicable to the intersentential
cases under discussion here (e.g., (3a)), since there’s no way to wrap the relevant linguistic environ-
ments (negation/question/negative quantifier/etc.) around two sentences at once. We make use of the
family-of-sentences test in discussing the intrasentential examples in §3.
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neither of these relationships are entailed by the passage. And in the case that the
addressee was unaware of either of these facts, he will presumably accommodate
them fairly effortlessly without evidence to the contrary. The situation is entirely
parallel to more familiar cases of presupposition accommodation, such as when a
hearer accommodates that the speaker has a brother in reaction to her uttering My
brother is coming to visit. Moreover, as before, a (here, confused) addressee could
likewise respond to (8a) with the objection in (8b). Again, (8a) asserts nothing to
the contrary; here the addressee’s response targets the presupposition that Swift is a
country singer.
Evidence that the presuppositions at play in these examples are pragmatic rather
than semantic is provided by the fact that they satisfy various diagnostics indicative
of pragmatic presupposition (Potts 2015). First, the ability to assign a truth value is
not at stake as with semantic presuppositions; the source of the possible incoherence
of (3b), for instance, does not arise from any inability to evaluate the truth of either
of its clauses. Second, the presupposed content represents background beliefs of the
speaker whose truths she takes for granted. Third, the status of particular examples
can change across contexts without having to stipulate a semantic ambiguity; recall
that the coherence of (3b) hinges on whether the context provides a basis for estab-
lishing a causal relationship between having red hair and being fired. Finally, the
presuppositions are non-conventional, that is, they do not arise from the presence of
any particular constituent.
3 Conversational eliciture
Thus far we have argued that coherence establishment involves a speaker’s pragmatic
presupposition of information that is necessary to establish the constraints associated
with the coherence relation that the hearer is intended to recognize. A notable
property of this process is that of being failure-driven: hearers must draw some
type of coherence relation between adjacent sentences within a discourse segment
in order to establish their coherence, lest they be left satisfied with discourses like
(3b). A factor that no doubt aids in the inference to a cause in (3a) is the fact that
the establishment of a coherence relation, in this case Explanation, comes for free,
thereby rescuing the discourse from failure.
Perhaps surprisingly, we see the same types of inferences drawn between the
meanings of constituents related intrasententially, in situations in which there is
no risk of failure nor other linguistic mandate to trigger inferential machinery. For
instance, an interpreter who hears sentence (9) is likely to enrich their interpretation
of the situation being described to include a causal relationship between the lateness
and firing by the same reasoning process that we characterized for (3a).
(9) The company fired the employee who came in late.
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This inference is defeasible: the sentence could be felicitously followed with the
sentence The reason the employee was fired is that he had been embezzling money.
This defeasibility is a direct result of the fact that, unlike the intersentential cases in
(3a-b), the inference drawn was not in service of satisfying a felicity requirement.
As such, intrasentential examples that do not elicit analogous enrichments are
nonetheless perfectly felicitous:
(10) The company fired the employee who has red hair.
As with (3b), the unavailability of a causal inference between having red hair and
being fired is a result of the lack of the type of causal knowledge that we captured
in (4). Unlike (3b), however, (10) is perfectly acceptable; here the relative clause
is merely understood to be identificational. In other work we have branded the
phenomenon that gives rise to such intrasentential, coherence-driven inferences with
the label CONVERSATIONAL ELICITURE (Cohen & Kehler 2016), a term intended
to capture the fact that, by choosing a particular form of reference, a speaker elicits
inferences on the part of the hearer that would not otherwise be drawn.
The fact that (9) gives rise to the same inference as the intersentential case (3a)
suggests that it relies on the same presupposed information. And as expected, we see
that tests for presupposition are satisfied in the same way. For instance, (7), repeated
below as (11), targets the presupposition associated with (9) in the same way that it
does for (3a).
(11) Hey, wait a minute. Union rules don’t allow someone to be fired for coming
in late!
Again, (11) is felicitous despite its failure to contradict anything that (9) asserts.
As pointed out by Potts (2015), the “Wait a minute” test does not cleanly
distinguish presuppositions from other information conveyed by utterances. Another
canonical test is provided by the so-called “family of sentences”: a collection of
constructions from which presuppositions are known to project. Among these
constructions are no-NP environments, never environments, questions, modals, and
negation; these are employed in (12a-e) respectively.
(12) a. The company fired no employee who came in late.
b. The company never fires employees who come in late.
c. Did the company fire the employee who came in late?
d. The company might fire the employee who came in late.
e. The company didn’t fire the employee who came in late.
We find that all of these give rise to the enrichment in question. This is particularly
true for (12a-b) which, like (1–2), involve quantification, and hence according to our
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proposal can be understood to affect truth conditions (see §6). Specifically, it seems
to us that these sentences could be judged true even in light of Snodgrass’s Situation.
The effect is predictably less strong in (12c-e) since the inferences in question are
merely pragmatic enrichments, yet we find them to be there. For instance, when
considering Snodgrass’s Situation, question (12c) is unlikely to get a straight yes
answer; it seems more likely that the answerer would want to cancel the eliciture:
yes, but they fired him for embezzling.
In summary, we have argued that the same inference processes that underlie
the establishment of coherence relations in intersentential cases like (3a) are those
responsible for intrasentential cases of eliciture in cases like (9). Despite the lack
of linguistic mandate in the case of eliciture, both phenomena involve a speaker’s
presupposition that certain types of world knowledge are in the common ground.
4 Eliciture compared to other types of expansion
A natural reaction to the types of inferences we have discussed is that they are
the result of procedures that have been argued to underlie other sorts of pragmatic
enrichment, such as from a violation of communicative norms based on principles
of rationality/cooperativity (i.e., IMPLICATURE, Grice 1975), or the need to fill in a
value for an otherwise unsaturated grammatical or semantic parameter (as in Bach’s
(1994) IMPLICITURE). Here we take a moment to argue that this line of thought
does not go through, and hence defend our coinage of a new term to describe the
process by which such inferences come about. The distinction between eliciture and
these other types of enrichment is important to pin down when considering the issue
of pragmatic intrusion into semantics (see §7).3
We first consider implicature. The central issue we see for an implicature analysis
is that, according to Grice, the inference to extrasemantic content is the result of
a rescue operation, triggered by the potential of norm violation. That is, as we
understand it, the Gricean account of a hearer’s inferential recovery of the content
that a speaker intends to convey extrasemantically involves roughly the following
four steps. First, the listener recovers the literal semantic content p for the speaker’s
utterance, fixing reference and resolving ambiguity as necessary. Second, he notices
that the content p, as expressed by the speaker in the operative circumstances, would
violate one or more Gricean maxims. Third, since he takes it that speakers, given a
presumption of cooperativity, ordinarily abide by these maxims, he infers that the
speaker must also intend to convey some additional content q whose expression in
the circumstances would make the utterance consistent with the maxims. Finally,
he therefore treats the utterance as conveying the maxim-compliant q (perhaps in
3 These arguments are taken from, and elaborated upon in, Cohen & Kehler 2016.
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combination with p).
The problem with construing eliciture in terms of implicature (so understood)
is that it is hard to see what Gricean norm could trigger the inferences at play in
examples like (9). Perhaps the first norm that emerges as a candidate is the Maxim of
Relation, which implores the speaker to ‘be relevant’. That is, one might react to (9)
with the thought that, by virtue of selecting a particular relative clause to modify the
object noun phrase over others that might have been possible, the choice of relative
clause has to be explained by way of establishing its relevance to some other aspect
of the sentence or discourse context. This story runs into an immediate problem,
however, in that pedestrian examples such as (10) demonstrate that the function of
allowing the addressee to identify the correct referent of the host noun phrase is
sufficient to establish the relevance of a relative clause; no additional inference is
necessary. But since the relative clause in example (9) serves this identificational
role as well — from a set of employees, it will pick out the one who came in late —
we are left without an explanation for why additional inferences of the sort drawn
for (9) would be necessary to satisfy the Relation/relevance maxim.
A second, and more general, problem is that it is unclear that there could be any
antecedent trigger for the search for relevance other than the recognition of relevance
itself. To see what we mean, consider sentences (13a-c).
(13) a. The apprentice scheduled a meeting with the engineer who always comes
to work late.
b. The manager scheduled a meeting with the engineer who I used to work
with.
c. The manager scheduled a meeting with the engineer who always comes to
work late.
On our judgment, neither (13a) nor (13b) strongly invites an inference about the
reason for the meeting. On the other hand, (13c) does, evoking the idea that the
reason the manager scheduled a meeting is because the engineer always comes
to work late (e.g., the manager intends to discipline the engineer). Whereas the
differences across examples (9–10) suggest that the relative clause is the trigger for
the extrasemantic inferences when they obtain, (13a-c) show the inference cannot be
tied to the occurrence of any one constituent. That is, (13a) lacks an inference even
though it features the same relative clause as (13c), and (13b) lacks an inference
even though it features the same subject noun phrase as (13c). Thus, it is only the
co-occurrence of multiple constituents that gives rise to the eliciture. But if that is
the case, then the only possible trigger for the inference would be machinery that
notices the potential associations among the meanings of constituents and serves up
the candidate strengthening — that is, the very machinery we have for establishing
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relevance itself. Hence, an appeal to the relevance norm puts the cart before the
horse: the machinery for establishing relevance in such cases receives no external
trigger; it is already running as part of the normal interpretative process.
In light of the drawbacks involving the Maxim of Relation, an alternative Gricean
line of attack would be to indict either of the Manner or Quantity maxims as the
trigger for the inferences. However, elicitures do not pattern with implicatures that
arise from potential violations of these maxims either. Compare (14a-c).
(14) a. The company fired the employee who came in late. (= 9)
b. The company fired the employee who has red hair. (= 10)
c. The company fired the employee who has red hair, a beard, and glasses.
As we have discussed, (14a) will generally be taken to convey the information that
the employee’s lateness was a cause of his firing, even though it is neither more prolix
nor more informative (in any relevant sense) than alternatives containing competing
referring expressions, such as (14b), that do not evoke the inference. Further, example
(14c) is more prolix than (14a), yet does not yield the inference that the employee’s
red hair, beard, and glasses were causes of his firing. What the injunctions against
prolixity and overinformativity do predict is that (14c) may well be odd in a situation
in which there is only one employee with red hair and the interlocutors are aware of
this — i.e., in a situation in which the less prolix/informative relative clause in (14b)
would have sufficed. But as these examples show, this effect is orthogonal to the
question of under what conditions a cause will be inferred from the relative clause.
We therefore conclude that these inferences need not be triggered by violations of
Gricean (or other) norms.
Another possible line of attack would be to characterize our cases as a variety of
Bach’s IMPLICITURE (or, for Relevance Theorists, part of the EXPLICATURE of an
utterance). Examples (15–16) are of the sort commonly cited.
(15) Donald is too crazy. [to be a serious contender for President]
(16) I haven’t had breakfast. [today]
For Bach, implicitures are enrichments that a hearer makes for one of two reasons.
The first is “because the utterance is semantically underdeterminate and completion
is required” (Bach 1994: 126) in order to assign a truth value. The enrichment in
(15) arises for this reason, as the utterance cannot be evaluated without knowing
with respect to what Donald is too crazy. The second reason is “because what is
being communicated is an expanded version of the proposition expressed” (p. 126), a
situation triggered by a hearer recognizing “that a speaker cannot be plausibly taken,
and therefore does not intend to be taken, to mean what he is saying” (p. 136). The
enrichment in (16) arises for this reason, as the speaker is unlikely to be claiming
970
Eliciture and domain restriction
that she has never had breakfast, and hence the meaning is narrowed to apply to
the current day. In a similar vein, Sperber & Wilson (1986: 174) likewise hold
that explicatures arise because the semantic representations fixed by utterances are
insufficiently determinate, and hence must be inferentially enriched, “before they
can be taken to represent anything of interest”.
Elicitures fail to pattern with these cases in two respects. First, like implicatures,
expansions in such examples are, as we just noted, the result of rescue strategies
triggered by a species of interpretative failure. In contrast, elicitures do not appear
to depend on any kind of incompleteness or infelicity, and are not triggered by a
grammatical shortcoming, a norm violation, nor any question on the part of the
hearer about the plausibility of the unenriched meaning of the utterance. Second,
implicitures/explicatures are restricted to cases involving the developments to the
logical form of an utterance. Elicitures, on the other hand, do not yield refinements
to the logical form of the utterance in which the associated constituents occur.
Instead, they give rise to additional propositions that sit alongside the meaning of
the utterance: The company fired the employee who came in late and the lateness
was the reason for the firing.
Hence, in opposition to these mechanisms that give rise to enrichment, we argue
that elicitures arise not from failure-triggered rescue strategies, but instead from the
more basic, associative mechanisms used to establish coherence between clauses as
described in §2–§3.
5 Presupposition and domain restriction
Thus far we have argued that the enrichments associated with examples such as
(9) are not the result of implicature or impliciture/explicature, but instead from the
process we have dubbed eliciture. Crucial to eliciture is the idea that certain types of
knowledge are presupposed by the speaker, and indeed the speaker intends that the
hearer recognize this fact and use it to draw the inference in question.
We now return to examples (1–2), in which domain restriction is at play. It is
well-known that context can restrict the domains of various sorts of natural language
expressions, including quantifiers, the antecedents of conditionals, generics, and
habituals. Witness the pedestrian case of entity level quantification in (17a):
(17) a. Every student will get an A.
b. Every student [ in the contextually-salient class ] will get an A.
In a typical context, in uttering the phrase every student the speaker does not intend
to make an assertion about every student in the world, but instead only to a more
restricted set, e.g. those in a particular class as in (17b).
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Operators that quantify over situations, of course, are subject to domain restric-
tion as well. That is, such operators rarely quantify over all times or events, but
instead over more narrow domains that are restricted by properties of the utter-
ance and the discourse context. Presupposition is one such property. For instance,
as von Fintel (1994) discusses at length, adverbial quantifiers interact with the
focus-presupposition partition, resulting in the accommodation of the presupposition
component of the quantifier’s scope into its domain restriction. So when a speaker
utters (18):
(18) Snodgrass usually shows up to work [LATE]F .
she does not mean that, considering all events that Snodgrass is engaged in, most are
instances of him showing up to work late. Instead, she intends to convey that when
Snodgrass shows up to work, he is usually late. This restriction is recoverable from
the information structure associated with (18): the noun late receives narrow focus,
leaving the presupposition as Snodgrass shows up to work X. This presupposition in
turn provides the basis for the domain restriction, yielding the meaning by which in
those situations in which Snodgrass is showing up to work (trivially, at some time),
he is usually late.
The role of presupposition in the calculation of domain restriction does not stop
there, however. In many cases, the events expressed by utterances presuppose that
certain states of the world hold at the time the event occurs. Consider (19a-c), from
Schubert & Pelletier (1987, 1989).
(19) John usually beats Marvin at ping pong.
b. Cats always land on their feet.
c. Robin Hood never misses.
Again, in all of these cases the quantification is intended to apply not to all situations,
but only to a more restricted set. For instance, (19a) does not mean that at any given
time John is likely to be beating Marvin at ping pong, but instead only at those times
at which they are playing ping pong. Sentence (19b) quantifies only over those
situations in which a cat is falling to the ground, and likewise (19c) quantifies over
those situations in which Robin Hood is shooting an arrow. The property common
to all of these cases is that the type of event expressed in the predicate presupposes
another type of event that ultimately restricts the domain of quantification: someone
beating someone else at a game presupposes that the event participants are playing
the game, landing presupposes an immediately prior state of falling, and missing a
target presupposes that one has just shot at it.
Our point here is twofold. First, when faced with an operator that quantifies over
situations, part of the hearer’s job is to infer what situations are being quantified
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over. Second, presuppositions that the speaker makes as part of communicating her
intended message can serve to constrain the set of situations being quantified over.
6 Analysis
The tools are now in place to explain the interpretations of our core cases. In the
examples just surveyed, presuppositions that project from the scope of a quantifier
serve to constrain the set of situations being quantified over. The scenario for
examples like (1) is different in at least two respects: the presupposition responsible
for the interpretive effect is triggered by material that lies in the restrictor of the
quantifier rather than its scope, and the presupposed information comes in the form
of a defeasible causal law. This notwithstanding, we see the underlying interpretive
processes as following a line similar to the more familiar examples. Specifically,
upon a speaker’s uttering a quantified sentence with an intended eliciture that relies
on a causal presupposition, the hearer infers that the domain of quantification is
restricted to those accessible situations in which the body of the presupposed rule
holds.
Consider a context with a speaker who utters sentence (1), repeated below as
(20), and the representation for it shown in (21):
(20) Every time the company fires an employee who comes in late, a union
complaint is lodged.
(21) ∀sC[∀x,e1,e2 ≤p s
[employee(x) & come_in_late(e1)(x) & f ire(e2)(employer(x))(x)
⇒∃e3 ≤p s [ f ile_complaint_against(e3)(union(x))(employer(x))]]]
The subscript C on the term sC signifies that the set of situations being quantified
over may be restricted by the operative context. And indeed, part of the hearer’s
interpretive task is to identify any such restrictions. At the same time, our hearer
reasons, in light of the speaker’s choice of referring expression, that she intends to
convey a causal eliciture, one that presupposes that axiom (4), repeated as (22), is in
the common ground.
(22) λ s.∀s′[AccC(s)(s′) &
∃x,e1,e2 ≤p s′ [employee(x) & come_in_late(e1)(x) &
f ire(e2)(employer(x))(x) & te1 < te2
⇒ cause(e1)(e2) ≤p s′ ]]
But as we have previously discussed, the conditional captured by this axiom applies
only to those accessible situations that meet certain background assumptions, i.e.
those ‘best’ situations as served up by an epistemic modal base and stereotypical
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ordering source. As such, it follows from the recognition of the speaker’s intention
to communicate an eliciture that relies on (22) that she also intends to restrict the
domain of quantification to those situations in which the conditional holds. Without
accommodating the requisite domain restriction there can be no eliciture, for the
enrichment would not hold in all the situations being quantified over.
The key point is that the inference process is essentially the same as with simpler
cases that do not involve quantification as in (9), except instead of identifying
what kind of situation is being described during utterance interpretation, the hearer
is identifying what kinds of situations are being quantified over. This is how an
enrichment that has the status of a defeasible, pragmatic inference in a case like (9)
takes on truth-conditional import when it serves to restrict the domain over which a
quantifier applies, just like other, more familiar sorts of pragmatically-determined
domain restriction.
In this section we have focused on the quantified case in (1). However, the
interpretation of the antecedent of the conditional in (2) would follow an analogous
process. Specifically, on a restrictor analysis of conditionals, the set of situations
over which the if -clause restricts interpretation will be narrowed to those in which a
causal relationship holds in the same way as we saw for quantified sentences, in light
of the recognition by the hearer that the speaker intends the eliciture to be drawn,
given the causal axiom in (22).
7 Reanalysis of pragmatic intrusion
In the previous section, a puzzling case of pragmatic intrusion into truth conditions
was resolved via an interaction among pragmatic presupposition, the processes that
underlie the establishment of coherence in discourse, and the identification of domain
restriction for operators in context. Key to our argument is that the enrichment is not
an implicature, nor any other type of post-semantic expansion.
Since at least Cohen (1971), the apparent possible truth of examples like (23)
— which, given the standard boolean semantics for conjunction, should express a
contradiction – has been regarded as problematic for theories (e.g., Grice’s) that
treat pragmatic enrichment as operating exclusively on the outputs of semantic
interpretation:
(23) If an employee chastises management and gets fired, then union leaders
will file a free-speech grievance, but if an employee gets fired and chastises
management, they won’t.
Because Levinson (2000) treats the enrichments in the antecedents of each condi-
tional as implicatures (specifically, Manner-/I-implicatures), he is forced to conclude
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that, contrary to the standard Gricean paradigm, implicatures can intrude upon
truth-conditional semantic content.
Our analysis of (2), however, suggests that this concession may be premature.
As we have argued, the enrichments at play in both intraclausal cases like (2) and
interclausal cases like (23) are presupposition-based, coherence-driven inferences,
and not implicatures. Whereas the antecedents of the two conditionals in (23) may be
truth-conditionally equivalent, the causal presuppositions that they rely on, and hence
their domain restrictions, are not: the first presupposes that chastising management
can cause one to get fired, whereas the second presupposes that getting fired can
cause one to chastise management.
Let us refer to the chastising as e1 and the firing as e2. The first antecedent,
represented in (24), presupposes that chastising management can cause one to
get fired as captured by (25), resulting in a set of accessible situations in which
cause(e1)(e2) is true.
(24) ∀sC[∀x,e1,e2 ≤p s
[employee(x) & chastise(e1)(x)(employer(x)) &
f ire(e2)(employer(x))(x)
⇒∃e3 ≤p s [ f ile_complaint(e3)(union(x))(employer(x))]]
(25) λ s.∀s′[AccC(s)(s′) &
∀x,e1,e2 ≤p s′ [employee(x) & chastise(e1)(x)(employer(x)) &
f ire(e2)(employer(x))(x) & te1 < te2
⇒ cause(e1)(e2)≤p s′]]
The second antecedent, represented in (26), presupposes that getting fired can cause
one to chastise management as captured by (27), resulting in a set of accessible
situations in which cause(e2)(e1) is true.
(26) ∀sC[∀x,e1,e2 ≤p s
[employee(x) & chastise(e1)(x)(employer(x)) &
f ire(e2)(employer(x))(x)
⇒¬∃e3 ≤p s [ f ile_complaint(e3)(union(x))(employer(x))]]
(27) λ s.∀s′[AccC(s)(s′) &
∀x,e1,e2 ≤p s′ [employee(x) & chastise(e1)(x)(employer(x)) &
f ire(e2)(employer(x))(x) & te1 > te2
⇒ cause(e2)(e1)≤p s′]]
Thus, whereas (24) and (26) would appear to be contradictory (they differ only in
the polarity of the consequent), they are in fact not, since they are evaluated with
respect to different domains of quantification. It is therefore expected on our view
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that conjunct ordering would have truth-conditional import in conditionals, without
having to concede that purportedly post-semantic enrichments intrude upon semantic
content.4
8 Conclusion
Examples like (1–2) presented a puzzle: why would a pragmatic enrichment, one
with the apparent hallmarks of a post-semantic inference and without any linguistic
or other type of mandate, have truth-conditional import? We have argued that such
examples receive a natural explanation by way of a novel interaction of otherwise fa-
miliar pragmatic processes: pragmatic presupposition, coherence establishment, and
the computation of domain restriction for operators that quantify over situations. The
proper analysis of such cases requires recognizing that coherence-driven inferences
are not species of implicature, impliciture, or other forms of pragmatic enrichment
4 One might ask how the correct temporal orderings come to be established for each of the antecedents
in (23). (Thanks to Ivano Caponigro for bringing this issue to our attention.) As we mentioned
in footnote 1, in cases in which an ordering is required by a presupposed causal law but is not
specified linguistically by the utterance, the analysis necessitates that the ordering be accommodated
by the hearer. However, there are two orderings that could be accommodated for (23) that would
avoid a contradiction: the intended one whereby forward movement of time is inferred between the
conjuncts in each antecedent, and a second in which the backward movement of time is inferred
in each case, i.e., whereby the clauses are understood as describing an effect followed by a cause.
On this construal, axioms (25) and (27) would be presupposed by the second and first conditional
antecedents respectively, rather than the other way around. As the latter possibility yields a consistent
reading, what rules it out?
On an analysis like ours in which orderings between events described with simple tenses are
constrained by the establishment of coherence relations (Lascarides & Asher 1993; Kehler 2002),
the second reading is eliminated by the fact that the conjunction and is inconsistent with relations
that require the events to occur in reverse order, particularly Explanation, the relation that the axioms
would support on the second reading. That is, whereas example (i) has an Explanation construal
whereby the embezzling preceded (and indeed, caused) the firing, this reading is eliminated in a
variant in which the clauses are conjoined with and as in (ii).
(i) Snodgrass was fired. He embezzled money.
(ii) Snodgrass was fired and he embezzled money.
Hence, the antecedents of the conditionals in (23) cannot receive the second logically consistent
reading, leaving the intended meaning as the sole remaining one.
Note that the pervasiveness of examples like (i) in discourse is problematic for other possible
explanations of the effect, for instance treating the simple past tense as anaphoric (in which case,
under suitable assumptions, the temporal order would be linguistically expressed and indeed encoded
in the logical form), or following Levinson by treating the effect as an implicature based on a principle
deriving from Grice’s Maxim of Manner, specifically the injunction to “be orderly”. Both approaches
should apply equally to conjoined-clause and separate-clause discourses like (i)–(ii), leaving the
existence of a reading of (i) in which the events move backward in time a mystery.
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upon which the field has focused. The analysis extends directly to cases like (23),
which have been used to argue for the intrusion of implicature into truth-conditional
meaning.
In this paper we have focused on causal elicitures that result from associations
between the meaning of a verb (e.g., fire) and that of a relative clause (e.g., who
came in late). The analysis, of course, is intended to extend more broadly to other
cases in which elicitures arise. Consider the situation in which an eliciture results
from the combination of a particular choice of a nominal and a predicate, as in (28).
(28) Every time a factory worker gets injured by a machine, the union performs
an investigation.
(29) Every time a factory worker falls seriously ill, the union helps them resolve
any problems with the insurance company.
It seems reasonable to think that, even in light of what (28) says, the union might
not investigate accidents that occur at a worker’s home (e.g., when building a hobby
project in a home shop). That is to say, the example invites the eliciture that the
worker has to be working at the factory at the time of the accident. An analogous
eliciture seems much less inevitable in (29), however, whereby the situations being
quantified over may well include ones in which the worker falls ill at places other
than work. (See Cohen & Kehler (2016) for further discussion of such cases.)
Notably, the elicitures in such cases are not causal, but are instead based on a type
of spatio-temporal contiguity-based coherence. The formal characterization of the
knowledge being presupposed and its use in inferring domain restriction in such
examples is a topic for future work.
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